McGeorge Law Review
Volume 5 | Issue 1

Article 21

1-1-1974

Crimes
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law, Crimes, 5 Pac. L. J. 320 (1974).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol5/iss1/21

This Greensheet is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

Crimes
Crimes; animal pelts
Penal Code §598a (new).
AB 461 (Boatwright); STATS 1973, Ch 778

Section 598a has been added to the Penal Code to make it a misdemeanor to: (1) kill any dog or cat with the sole intent to sell
or give away the pelt of the animal; (2) possess, import into this
state, sell, buy, give away, or accept the pelt of a dog or cat with
the sole intent of selling or giving away that pelt; or (3) to possess,
import into this state, sell, buy, give away, or accept a dog or cat
with the sole intent to kill it or have it killed for the purpose of
selling or giving away the pelt.
See Generally:
1) Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 794 (1962) (cruelty to animals).

Crimes; boxing matches
Business and Professions Code §§18753.5, 18753.6 (new).
AB 469 (Garcia); STATS 1973, Ch 486

Section 18753.5 has been added to the Business and Professions
Code to provide that any person who throws any object or thing at
the ring during a boxing contest or match is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 18753.6 has been added to require that a notice in English
and Spanish be posted in public view at every place where a boxing
match is held, warning that it is unlawful to throw any object or
thing at the ring during a boxing contest or match.
Crimes; controlled substances
Health and Safety Code §§11056, 11377 (amended).
AB 2500 (Fenton); STATS 1973, Ch 1088

(Effective October 1, 1973)
Section 11056 of the Health and Safety Code has been amended
to provide that any material, compound, mixture, or preparation which
contains any quantity of methaqualone or its salts having a potential
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for abuse associated with a depressant effect on the central nervous
system is included in Schedule III of the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE div. 10 (commencing with § 11000)].
Section 11377 has been amended to provide that, except as otherwise provided in Article 8 (commencing with §4211) of the Business
and Professions Code (details exceptions to prohibitions against possessing, furnishing, or dispensing drugs without prescription), every
person who possesses any controlled substance containing methaqualone or its salts, unless upon prescription of a physician, dentist, podiatrist, or veterinarian licensed to practice in this state, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment in the county jail
not exceeding six months, or by both.
The first conviction for unlawful possession for sale of any substance classified in Schedule Ill is punishable under Section 11378
by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than two years or
more than ten years. Section 11379 provides that every person who
unlawfully transports, imports into the state, sells, manufactures, compounds, furnishes, administers, or gives away any controlled substance
classified in Schedule HI, or offers to do so, or attempts to import or
transport any such substance, shall be punished by imprisonment in
the state prison for five years to life. Both sections provide increased
penalties for persons with prior, drug-related felony convictions.
COMMENT
Methaqualone, marketed principally under the trade name "Quaalude," was developed in 1965 and is a non-barbiturate, hypnotic sedative [Assemblyman Jack R. Fenton, Press Release, May 17, 1973].
As of this writing, methaqualone is not listed as a controlled substance
under federal law.
See Generally:
1) 21 U.S.C. §801 et seq. (1970)

(federal drug abuse prevention and control).

(California

2)

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE div. 10 (commencing with §11000)
Uniform Controlled Substances Act).

3)

4 PAc. L.J., REvIEw OF SELECTED 1972 CALIFORNI'A LEGISLATION 378 (1973)

(California Uniform Controlled Substances Act).

Crimes; death penalty
Penal Code §§190, 190.1, 209, 219, 4500 (repealed); §§190,
190.1, 190.2, 190.3, 209, 219, 4500 (new); §1018 (amended).
SB 450 (Deukmejian); STATS 1973, Ch 719
Selected 1973 California Legislation
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Support: California Peace Officers Association; The District Attorneys of California; California State Sheriffs' Association; California
Correctional Officers' Association
In People v. Anderson [6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152 (1972)] the California Supreme Court declared that imposition of the death penalty was "cruel or unusual" punishment in
violation of Article I, Section 6 of the California Constitution. The
following November, a state constitutional amendment was adopted
which deemed the death penalty, as provided for under state statutes,
to be neither cruel or unusual nor otherwise in violation of the state
constitution [See CAL. CONST. art. I, §27]. However, in Furman
v. Georgia [408 U.S. 238 (1972)] the United States Supreme Court,
in a split per curiam decision, held the imposition of the death penalty
in the particularcases before the Court violated the eighth amendment
ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The thrust of this ruling has been
interpreted as being aimed more at the procedure for imposing the
death penalty than as declaring it unconstitutional per se. Chapter
719 operates as a substantive revision of California's capital punishment law in response to the decision rendered in Farman.
Section 190, as enacted by Chapter 719, has been added to the
Penal Code to require a mandatory death sentence for every person
found guilty of first-degree murder if any one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 (discussed infra) have
been charged and found to be true in the manner provided in Section
190.1 (discussed infra). Every person otherwise guilty of first-degree
murder shall suffer life imprisonment. Every person guilty of seconddegree murder is subject to imprisonment from five years to life.
Former Section 190, repealed by Chapter 719, provided for the court
or jury, at their discretion, to determine whether the punishment of
death or life imprisonment would be imposed on a person convicted
of first-degree murder.
Section 190.2, as added, provides that the penalty for a person found
guilty of first-degree murder shall be death in any case in which the
trier of fact makes a special finding in the penalty phase of a bifurcated
trial (§190.1 as added) that either (a) or (b) of the following special
circumstances exist: (a) the murder was intentional and was carried
out pursuant to an agreement to accept valuable consideration for the
murder from any person other than the victim; or (b) the defendant
personally committed the act which caused the death of the victim
and any of the following additional circumstancesexist: (1) the victim
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 5
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is a peace officer (as defined in §830.1, subdivision (a) of §830.2,
or subdivision (b) of §830.5) who was intentionally killed in the
performance of his duty, and the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance
of his duty; (2) the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated,
and the victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed
for the purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceeding;
(3) the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated and was
committed during the commission or attempted commission of any
of the following crimes: (i) robbery (§211); (ii) kidnapping
(§§207, 209 discussed infra)-however, brief movements of the victim which are only incidental to the commission of another offense
and which do not substantially increase the risk of harm over that
necessarily inherent in the other offense do not constitute kidnapping
for purposes of this section; (iii) rape by force or violence or by
threat of immediate bodily harm (§261 (2) or (3)); (iv) performance
of a lewd act with a child under 14 years of age (§288); (v) burglary of
an inhabited dwelling entered by the defendant with the intent to commit
grand or petit larceny or rape (§460(1)); or (4) the defendant is a
multiple murderer having been convicted of more than one offense
of first or second degree murder in this or any prior proceeding (an
offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in California would be punishable as first or second degree murder shall
be deemed to be murder of the first or second degree for purposes
of this paragraph).
It is important to note that S.B. 450 was amended in the Assembly
to delete a subdivision of Section 190.2, consistent with prior law,
which would have required a mandatory death penalty if the trier
of fact made a special finding of "aggravating circumstances" surrounding the offense which, when viewed in light of the defendant's
background and history, would demonstrate a "substantial likelihood"
that he would kill again. Such an evaluation by the court or jury
of the applicability of the death penalty to the particular defendant
would have exhibited a degree of discretion which would have posed
serious constitutional problems in light of the Supreme Court's ruling
in Furman (discussed infra).
Section 190.1, as enacted by Chapter 719, provides for a bifurcated
trial procedure to be followed in any case in which the death penalty
is to be imposed for an offense involving one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2. The first proceeding is
to determine only the issue of guilt or innocence. If the defendant
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has been found guilty of first-degree murder, and has been found
sane on any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, there shall be
further proceedings on the issue of the special circumstances charged.
In such further proceedings the defendant must again be represented
by counsel. Evidence may be presented at these proceedings to establish whether or not the special circumstances charged are true or not
true. In case of a reasonable doubt of the truth of a special circumstance, the defendant is entitled to a finding that it is not true. The
trier of fact shall make a special finding that each special circumstance
charged is either true or not true.
The identity of the trier of fact in the "special circumstances"
phase is determined in a substantially different manner than was provided for under prior law (former §190.1) which applied the bifurcated trial procedure to all first-degree murder cases. Under the newly
enacted Section 190.1, if the defendant was convicted in the first phase
by the court sitting without a jury, the trier of fact shall be a jury,
unless a jury is waived by the defendant with the consent of the defendant's counsel, in which case the trier of fact shall be the court.
If the defendant was convicted by a plea of guilty, the trier of fact
shall be a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant with the
consent of his counsel. If the defendant was convicted by a jury,
the trier of fact shall be the same jury unless, for good cause shown,
the court discharges that jury, in which case a new jury shall be
drawn. It should be noted that Chapter 719 has also amended Section
1018 of the Penal Code which, in pertinent part, now provides that
no plea of guilty of a capital offense shall be received from a defendant
who does not appear with counsel, nor shall any such plea be received
without the consent of the defendant's counsel. Further, a plea of
guilty shall not be received from a defendant charged with a capital
offense which does not require the further proceedings provided for
in Section 190.1.
Section 190.1 also provides that if any one of the special circumstances charged is found in the penalty proceeding to be true, the
defendant shall suffer death. The penalty shall stand regardless of
whether remaining special circumstances alleged are found to be not
true, or whether a jury is unable to agree on the truth of any such
remaining special circumstances.
If the jury in the penalty phase is unable to reach a unanimous
verdict that one or more of the special circumstances charged are true,
and does not reach a unanimous verdict that all of the special circumPacific Law Journal Vol. 5
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stances are not true, Section 190.1 provides that the jury shall be
dismissed and a new jury empaneled. Such new jury shall not retry
the issue of guilt, nor the issue of the truth of any special circumstances which were found by a unanimous verdict of the previous
jury to be untrue. If the new jury is also unable to reach a unanimous
verdict that one or more of the special circumstances are true, the
court shall dismiss the jury and impose the punishment of life imprisonment. Before this section was passed, .it was amended to delete
a provision which would have allowed the court, after dismissing a
jury which was unable to find at least one special circumstance as
true, to either impose the punishment of life imprisonment or order
a new jury empaneled to try the issues. Again a serious potential
constitutional challenge was avoided by amending out the discretionary
aspect of a procedure involved in the imposition of the death penalty.
Chapter 719 also establishes mandatory death sentences for the
crimes of kidnapping (§209 as added) and trainwrecking (§219 as
added). The punishment shall be death .in any case in which any
person subjected to the above acts suffers death as a result. The
penalty shall be life imprisonment without possibility of parole in cases
where any such person suffers bodily harm, or life imprisonment with
possibility of parole in cases where no person suffers death or bodily
harm. Previous law (§§209, 219 as repealed) provided an alternative
penalty of death or life imprisonment to be imposed at the discretion
of the trier of fact.
Section 4500, as added, requires a mandatory death sentence for
any life prisoner who commits a malicious assault with a deadly weapon or deadly force upon the person of one other than another inmate.
If the victim does not die within a year and a day, or if the victim
is another inmate, the penalty is life imprisonment without possibility
of parole for nine years. This section is expressly stated to also apply
when the assault was committed outside the walls of any prison as
long as the person committing the assault was undergoing a life sentence in a state prison at the time.
Section 190.3 has been added to the Penal Code to provide that
the death penalty shall not be imposed upon any person who was
under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the crime.
The burden of proof as to age shall be on the defendant. It also
shall not be imposed upon any person who is a principal in the commission of a capital offense unless: (1) he was personally present and
directly committed or aided in the commission of such act or acts;
(2) the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement as defined
Selected 1973 California Legislation
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in subdivision (a) of Section 190.2 (discussed supra); or (3) a person
is convicted of a violation of Section 37 (treason against the State)
or Section 128 (procuring the execution of an innocent person by
perjury).
Section 15 of Chapter 719 declares the provisions of the chapter
to be severable.
COMMENT
Chapter 719 comprises the initial legislative response to Furman
v. Georgia [408 U.S. 593 (1972)]. In Furmanthe Supreme Court, in a
decision including five separate supporting and four separate dissenting
opinions, held that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty
under the currently administered systems of the cases before the Court
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. The cases before the Court involved state
statutes providing for imposition of the death penalty, or life imprisonment in the alternative, at the discretion of the court or jury. Three of
the concurring justices (Justices Stewart, White, and Douglas) took the
position that the cruel and unusual characteristic of the death penalty was
the manner in which it has been administered. They left open the question whether any system of capital punishment would be unconstitutional per se.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, observed that because
the legislature provided for an alternative penalty of life imprisonment
in capital offenses, it follows that the legislature did not make
a determination that those offenses could be deterred only by imposing
the death penalty on all who perpetrate them. He concluded that
death sentences are therefore "cruel" because they go excessively beyond the punishments that the legislature has determined to be necessary. The sentences are "unusual" in that they are infrequently imposed. Pointing out that many murderers and rapists just as reprehensible as those before the Court did not receive as severe a penalty,
he emphasized, "I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the inflicting of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly
and so freakishly imposed" [408 U.S. at 310].
Justice Stewart made it clear he was not deciding the issue of the
death penalty "in the abstract." On that issue he conceded that retribution is a constitutionally permissible ingredient in the imposition
of a punishment, stating, "We would need to decide whether a legislature.

. .

could constitutionally determine that certain criminal conduct

Pacific Law Journal Vol. 5

Crimes
is so atrocious that society's interest in deterrence and retribution
wholly outweighs any considerations of reform or rehabilitation of the
perpetrator, and that, despite the inconclusive empirical evidence, only
the automatic penalty of death will provide maximum deterrence' [408
U.S. at 307-08 (emphasis added)].
It is fairly clear from his specific conclusion and the reference to
an automatic penalty that the mandatory scheme of Chapter 719 is
consistent with Justice Stewart's holding in Furman. It is also clear
that such a scheme presents to him a further issue "in the abstract."
One may infer from the mere fashioning of the balancing test above
that Justice Stewart does not consider the legislature an infallible reflection of the public attitudes on such an issue, but rather subject to
judicial consideration of whether the relevant factors have been properly applied. Whether he will find the legislative decision embodied
in Chapter 719 to be properly arrived at "despite inconclusive empirical data" is not indicated by his opinion.
Concurring, Justice White maintained that when the death penalty
ceases realistically to further the social ends for which it was imposed,
then it violates the eighth amendment as a pointless and needless extinction of life with only "marginal contributions to any discernible
social or public purposes" [408 U.S. at 312]. In his judgment, the
penalty no longer serves its intended purpose of deterrence when juries
refuse to impose it. "I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes
before us are now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed
that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service
to criminal justice" [408 U.S. at 313]. Legislative policies are therefore defined by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion
conferred on them, and not by what is legislatively authorized.
Chapter 719 has removed the discretionary element Justice White
found so objectionable in Furman. However, his opinion does not
imply that a mandatory sentencing procedure would insure a deterrent
effect. He left the issue largely open, conceding only that it is difficult
to prove that capital punishment, "however administered," is a more
effective deterrent to crime than is imprisonment [408 U.S. at 313].
Justice Douglas found that the basic theme of equal protection is
implicit in the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment Relying on studies and commentaries to the effect that the
death penalty is imposed disproportionately often on the poor, black,
young, and ignorant, he concluded, "Thus, these discretionary statutes
are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with disSelected 1973 California Legislation
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crimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with
the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban
on 'cruel and unusual' punishments" [408 U.S. at 256-57]. The procedures provided by Chapter 719 would seem to satisfy the equal
protection requirements of Justice Douglas; but whether he would find
a mandatory death penalty to be otherwise constitutional is a question
he expressly declined to answer.
Justices Brennan and Marshall also concurred in the judgment of
the Court. Six other justices asserted that Justices Brennan and Marshall had concluded that the eighth amendment abolishes capital punishment altogether. However, this is not a necessary inference from
their opinions.
Justice Brennan relied on four principles to determine whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual: (1) "a punishment must not be
so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings" [408
U.S. at 271]; (2) "the government must not arbitrarily inflict a
severe punishment" [408 U.S. at 274]; (3) "a severe punishment must
not be unacceptable to contemporary society" [408 U.S. at 277]; and (4)
"a severe punishment must not be excessive," i.e., "unnecessary" [408
U.S. at 279]. He concluded that capital punishment by its very nature
violates the first principle and would have held it unconstitutional on
that ground alone "were it not that death Is a punishment of longstanding usage and acceptance in this country" [408 U.S. at 291].
In discussing the remaining three principles, Justice Brennan relied
heavily on the fact of infrequent and arbitrary imposition of the penalty
under current systems. The death penalty was being inflicted in a
"trivial" number of cases in which it was available; therefore, it was
probably being inflicted arbitrarily in violation of the second principle.
When a penalty is authorized for wide-scale application and it is inflicted only in a few instances, the inference is that society does not
accept the penalty, violating the third principle. When the death penalty is arbitrarily and infrequently applied, the risk of death to the
potential perpetrator is remote and improbable, and the deterrent effect
can be no greater than the threat of life imprisonment; the death penalty is therefore excessive and violates the fourth principle. Finding
the punishment inconsistent with all four principles, he concluded it
did not comport with human dignity and was therefore cruel and unusual.
Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty violates the eighth
amendment on two independent grounds: (1) "it is excessive and
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 5
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serves no valid purpose" [408 U.S. at 353]; and (2) "it is abhorrent to
currently existing moral values" [408 U.S. at 360]. Relying on statistical data showing no correlation between the rate of capital crimes
and the presence or absence of the death penalty, he saw no rational
basis upon which a legislature could conclude that capital punishment
is not excessive; that is, death is not a more effective deterrent than
life imprisonment. As for the second ground, Justice Marshall concluded that the average citizen, if he had knowledge of all the pertinent
facts, would find capital punishment "shocking to his conscience and
sense of justice" [408 U.S. at 369].
Although the first ground would seem to allow the imposition of
a mandatory death sentence for certain crimes where life imprisonment
is not a deterrent (Le., crimes committed by life prisoners), the second
subjective ground appears to preclude any system of capital punishment.
Dissenting Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist, concluded that the eighth amendment cannot
be construed to bar the imposition of the death penalty. He observed
that it is primarily the responsibility of the legislatures, not the courts,
to decide what is cruel and unusual. 'Whether or not provable, and
whether or not true at all times, in a democracy the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards of decency prevailing
in the society. This presumption can only be negated by unambiguous and compelling evidence of legislative default" [408 U.S. at 384].
To the Chief Justice there were no obvious indicators that the death
penalty offended the conscience of society at the time of Furman.
In light of the people's initiative enabling the enactment of Chapter
719, it would seem Chief Justice Burger would have little hesitation
in upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty.
However, contrary to the plurality opinions, Justice Burger saw juror
discretion as the keystone of criminal justice. "I could more easily be
persuaded that mandatory sentences of death, without the intervening
and ameliorating impact of lay jurors, are so arbitrary and doctrinaire
that they violate the Constitution" [408 U.S. at 402]. He further
stated that he would have preferred the majority to opt for total abolition if mandatory sentences are the only alternative.
Thus the mandatory procedures of Chapter 719 may present a serious constitutional question to the Chief Justice. He may well hesitate
on this position, however, as a decision invalidating a mandatory
death sentence would, combined with Furman, eliminate the penalty
Selected 1973 California Legislation
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altogether. Such a result would not seem to reflect the primary holding of the Chief Justice's opinion.
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, in their separate opinions,
emphasized again that what is cruel and unusual within the meaning
of the eighth amendment is a question of public opinion, that the
assessment of such public opinion is essentially a legislative function,
and that the legislatures do not support the contention that evolving
standards of decency require abolition of capital punishment.
In conclusion, it appears clear that Chapter 719 is generally responsive to procedural guidelines laid down by the plurality opinion in Furman. The discretion of the court or jury has been removed, and an
automatic penalty of death is imposed upon the finding of certain
specified facts coincident to certain specified crimes. However, the
very change in the nature of the penalty which may make it appealing
to the pivotal members of the plurality may also cause it to lose
support among other members of the court. Whether Chapter 719,
or any system of capital punishment, can withstand a challenge as
to its constitutional validity as a punishment per se is a question which
can still command only a very speculative answer. It appears probable
that the four dissenting justices in Furman would again uphold validity.
It is not decidedly improbable they would be joined by either Justice
Stewart or Justice White, or both.
See Generally:
1) H. BEDAu, TIm DEAT- PENALTY 11 AMERICA (1964).

2)
3)

Bedau, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Reconsideration, 61 J. CrM. L.C.
& P.S. 539 (1970).
Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT.
REV. 1.

4)

Sellin, The Death Penalty, appendix to A.L.I. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft

No. 9) (1959) (critique of comparative data on deterrent effect of death penalty).

Crimes; fetus experimentation
Health and Safety Code §25956 (new).
SB 1046 (Roberti); STATS 1973, Ch 720
(Effective September 14, 1973)
AB 1724 (Antonovich); STATS 1973, Ch 980
Section 25956 has been added to the Health and Safety Code to
provide that it is unlawful for any person to use any aborted product
of human conception, other than fetal remains, for any type of scientific or laboratory research or for any other kind of experimentation
or study, except to protect or preserve the life and health of the
fetus. "Fetal remains" is defined as a lifeless product of conception
330
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regardless of the duration of pregnancy. A fetus shall not be deemed
to be lifeless for the purposes of this section, unless there is an absence
of a discernible heartbeat. Section 25956(b) states that in addition
to any other criminal or civil liability which may be imposed by law,
a violation of this section constitutes unprofessional conduct within
the meaning of the State Medical Practice Act [CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE ch. 5 (commencing with §2000)]. Thus any licensee violating
this section may have his professional license suspended or revoked
or may be subjected to other disciplinary proceedings.
See Generally:

1)

Diamond, Humanity of the Unborn Child, 17 CATH. LAW. 11 (1971).

Crimes; forged county warrants
Penal Code §475a (amended).
AB 1626 (Berman); STATs 1973, Ch 822
Support: Los Angeles District Attorney
Section 475a of the Penal Code has been amended to include county
warrants within the list of negotiable instruments which may not be
possessed with the intent to pass for the purpose of defrauding others.
Prior to amendment, the section included only cheeks, money orders,
and travelers' checks. The section has also been amended to reduce
the maximum prison term which may be imposed for violations of
this section from 14 years to 10 years in state prison. The amendment
of this section appears to be in response to People v. Norwood [26
Cal. App. 3d 148, 103 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1972)]. In that case, Norwood
was found guilty of three counts of violating Penal Code Section 475a.
Two of the counts involved possession of a completed county warrant,
and the third was based on possession of a travelers' check. The court
of appeal reversed the counts related to possession of the county
warrant, taking the view that a county warrant did not come within
the definition of any of the instruments listed in the statute.
See Generally:
1) CAL. GOV'T CODE §53911; CAL. COMM. CoDE §3104(2)(b) (county warrants
are not technically checks and cannot be included within §475a of the Penal
Code as such).

Crimes; interference with a fireman
Penal Code §§148.3, 245.1 (amended).
AB 1033 (Alatorre); STATS 1973, Ch 471
Support: League of California Cities
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Section 148.2 of the Penal Code establishes misdemeanor penalties
for a person who: (1) resists or interferes with the lawful efforts
of any fireman engaged in the discharge or attempted discharge of
an official duty; (2) disobeys the lawful orders of any fireman
or public officer; (3) engages in disorderly conduct which delays
or prevents a fire from being timely extinguished; or (4) forbids or
prevents others from assisting in extinguishing a fire or exhorts another
person, as to whom he has! no legal right or obligation to protect
or control, from assisting in extinguishing a fire. Section 148.2 has
been amended to place interference with emergency rescue personnel
within this prohibition.
Section 245.1 has been amended to define emergency rescue personnel, as used in Section 148.2, to be fire department officers, employees,
members, or volunteers while they are actually engaged in on-thesite rescue of persons or property during an emergency.
Crimes; penalties associated with
hallucinogens and amphetamines
Health and Safety Code §§11350, 11351, 11352, 11353, 11354,
11355, 11357, 11358, 11359, 11360, 11361, 11363, 11364,
11365, 11366, 11368, 11370, 11371, 11376, 11377, 11378,
11379, 11380, 11382, 11550 (amended).
AB 2228 (Sieroty); STATS 1973, Ch 1078
(Effective October 1, 1973)
The 1972 session of the California Legislature enacted the Uniform
Controlled Substances Act [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11000 et
seq.]. This Act placed each controlled substance within one of five
schedules which were then used for imposing penalties for offenses
connected therewith. The most dangerous of the substances were
placed in Schedule I and the least dangerous in Schedule V. Those
substances which had formerly been classified as restricted dangerous
drugs were generally placed in Schedule I or IV. However, certain
substances were not. These include the hallucinogens and the amphetamines which were placed in Schedules I and II. The punishment
for an offense associated with a restricted dangerous drug had been
either a misdemeanor or a felony. The punishment for an offense
associated with the substances in Schedules I and II was a mandatory
felony. Thus there was a great increase in punishment for an offense
associated with the same substance depending on whether one was
tried under the old or the new law. Chapter 1078 has been enacted
Pacific Law Journal Vol. .5
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to bring the penalties for offenses associated with the hallucinogens
and amphetamines back to the degree of severity which they previously
had.
Chapter 1078 also instructs the courts that they may, if so petitioned, grant a reduction in punishment for those convicted under
the 1972 enactment if their punishment was harsher than would be
imposed under this chapter.
Crimes; telephone fraud penalties
Penal Code §502.7 (amended).
SB 1262 (Song); STATS 1973, Ch 1127
Section 502.7 of the Penal Code provides misdemeanor penalties
for a variety of acts which defraud telephone or telegraph companies
of charges for telephone or telegraph services. Prior to amendment,
the penalties increased to up to one year in the county jail or five
years in the state prison, or a fine of up to $5,000, or both, if the
value of the services improperly obtained exceeded $200 over any 12month period during the three years preceding the filing of charges.
Chapter 1127 amends Section 502.7 of the Penal Code to decrease
the maximum state prison sentence to one year and one day.
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